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# Angela Merkel and Donald Trump – Values, Interests, and the Future of the West

KLAUS LARRES

*German Chancellor Merkel and US President Donald Trump did not get off to a good start. Their relationship so far has been lukewarm at best. Trump's deficits in understanding and lack of support for democracy and the liberal world order as it was established by Trump's predecessors in the mid-1940s deeply worries European politicians. In view of their own past history and the expectation that Germany may have to step in and become the western world's leading defender of western values, most German policy makers, including the long-serving chancellor, are particularly annoyed and distraught about the developments in the US. This article will analyse the evolving relationship between Angela Merkel and Donald Trump since the latter moved into the Oval Office in January 2017. The article will highlight both the more fundamental structural problems and the day-to-day political hurdles in German–American relations.*

Chancellor Merkel has been in office since October 2005.<sup>1</sup> During that comparatively long period of time she has had to deal with three American presidents. None of her relations with the self-confident but prickly leaders were easy. The current incumbent, however, appears to present a particular challenge. Within days of Donald Trump's election victory in early November 2016 German–American relations plummeted. Subsequent phone calls and meetings between Merkel and Trump, either in a bilateral or a multilateral context, could not overcome the coldness between the two leaders. In fact, relations seem to have become worse over time. In this article, I wish to trace German–American relations under Merkel and Trump and analyse the deeper reasons for the growing estrangement between the two governments which, after all, have been close allies and partners for almost 70 years. In fact, despite the deep divisions over the Iraq war of 2003 and various other smaller crises, until very recently Germany could be regarded as one of America's closest and most reliable global allies.

## BUSH, OBAMA, AND ANGELA MERKEL

Germany's relationship with George W. Bush's America was burdened by the legacy of the invasion of Iraq that was much opposed by the German public and the Schröder government, though not by Angela Merkel herself.<sup>2</sup> Chancellor Schröder deeply angered the US when he pronounced that 'this country under my leadership is not available for adventures'.<sup>3</sup> Not much was left of the idea expressed by the older President

Bush during a speech in Mainz in May 1989 that Germany ought to be a ‘partner in leadership’ with the US.<sup>4</sup> Opposition leader Merkel actually supported America’s war in Iraq half-heartedly. This attitude helped her when she attempted, successfully as it turned out, to overcome frosty German–American relations and develop a good working relationship with President George W. Bush. This was perhaps best symbolised by the friendly and unusually personal shoulder rub Bush gave the chancellor when passing by her seat during the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg in early 2006.<sup>5</sup> In his memoirs Bush referred to Merkel as ‘trustworthy, engaging and warm’; she quickly became one of ‘my closest friends on the world stage’.<sup>6</sup> By the time he wrote his memoirs shortly after leaving office in 2009 the initial tension between him and the German chancellor had long since been forgotten.

Merkel’s relations with the succeeding Obama administration also proved contentious at first. Not least this was due to the global financial and economic crisis and the Euro crisis that resulted. Washington put forward a number of prescriptions of how to tackle the dire situation by means of deficit spending and a huge stimulus programme that found very little favour in Berlin and Brussels.<sup>7</sup> Eventually, however, Obama largely came round to the German view. As early as 5 June 2009, during a joint press conference with Merkel in Dresden, he indicated somewhat reluctantly that the growth of the US economy (and by implication global growth) ‘can’t be based on overheated financial markets or overheated housing markets or U.S. consumers maxing out on their credit cards or us sustaining non-stop deficit spending as far as the eye can see’.<sup>8</sup> Yet Obama never wavered in his criticism of Germany’s export surpluses, which in his view were not put to good use. Instead of the revenues being utilised to bolster German saving accounts and the coffers of the finance minister, they ought to be invested to spur growth and demand. The Germans should spend and consume more, he advised.<sup>9</sup>

Edward Snowden’s revelations of US espionage activities in Germany during Obama’s second term caused much resentment and for a time led to a significant cooling of German–American relations.<sup>10</sup> Yet, on the whole, Merkel managed to sustain good relations with the administration. Not least, both politicians liked to intellectually spar with each other and shared a deep belief in the importance of upholding western values and democratic institutions. Being invited to address a joint session of Congress in 2010, the first German chancellor to do so for 52 years,<sup>11</sup> and the award of the Presidential Medal of Freedom less than two years later were the outward high points of her excellent relationship with Obama.<sup>12</sup> In fact, despite tense beginnings with Presidents Bush and Obama, Merkel succeeded in developing relations with both that approximated genuine friendships, in particular with Obama. Fostering a personal relationship with President Trump, however, has proven to be much more challenging.

### *Trump’s Election Campaign*

It is doubtful if Merkel had ever heard of Trump before he began running for president in 2015. The notorious prominence he had established in the US since the 1970s as a ruthless New York property baron and then, from 2003, as the TV host of *The Apprentice* did not make much headway in Europe. The TV series was shown in the UK, however, and was equally popular. It featured British entrepreneur Alan Sugar as

host, who, like Trump, seemed to get a thrill out of firing people who in his view did not make the cut. The adoption of the show in Germany in 2004 with a local host proved to be a flop, however.<sup>13</sup>

It was during the Republican primary elections that Trump came to general attention in Germany. His strident rhetoric and his skilful and frequently vulgar outmanoeuvring of his Republican rivals such as Jeb Bush, Marco Rubio and many others made him a household name among those interested in American politics. This included the German chancellor and the country's foreign policy establishment. Trump had no hesitation to refer to the chancellor in many of his campaign speeches and interviews – usually in a less than complimentary manner. Certainly, his German ancestry did not seem to influence him in a pro-German way. Trump's grandfather grew up in the village of Kallstadt less than 50 miles from Frankfurt and in 1885 aged 16 he emigrated to the US to escape poverty.<sup>14</sup>

It appears that Trump had genuine respect for Merkel's long-standing skilful leadership qualities but was deeply upset by her immigration and refugee policies.<sup>15</sup> In October 2015, for instance, he said in an interview: 'What she's done in Germany is insane'. He predicted that 'They're going to have riots in Germany'.<sup>16</sup> He talked about Merkel having made a 'catastrophic mistake' and called her refugee policy a 'total disaster'. He indicated to Germany's mass circulation newspaper *Bild* in January that opening the door to refugees was allowing potential terrorists in. 'I like her but I think it was a mistake. And people make mistakes, but I think it was a very big mistake.'<sup>17</sup> Ever competitive and keen on the limelight, he was upset when *Time Magazine* did not choose him as the Person of the Year. Trump complained via Twitter in late 2015 that the magazine had preferred instead to pick the woman who was 'ruining Germany'.<sup>18</sup>

Commenting on the New Year's Eve assaults on women in Cologne at a campaign event in Iowa, Trump once again predicted unrest in Germany and also attacked Merkel personally. He declared that 'The German people are going to riot. The German people are going to end up overthrowing this woman. I don't know what the hell she is thinking'.<sup>19</sup> In the same month he returned to the issue. 'What Merkel did to Germany is a shame, it's a sad, sad shame', he pronounced.<sup>20</sup> A few months later he referred to Germans leaving their country in droves. 'These are people', he explained, 'that were very proud Germans that were beyond belief, they thought the greatest that there ever was [sic!] and now they're talking about leaving Germany.'<sup>21</sup>

These sharp criticisms, however, did not stop him from changing his mind when it pleased him. In September 2016 Trump explained in an interview that he thought 'Merkel is a really great world leader'. Yet he could not get over her refugee policy. 'I was very disappointed', he said, about 'the whole thing on immigration. It's a big problem and really, you know, to look at what she's done in the last year and a half. I was always a Merkel person. I thought really fantastic. But I think she made a very tragic mistake a year and a half ago'.<sup>22</sup>

### *Trump's Electoral Victory and the Reaction in Germany*

When Trump won the election on 8 November 2016, the German foreign policy establishment was profoundly shocked. Like most foreigners, the Germans had confidently expected Hillary Clinton to move into the Oval Office.<sup>23</sup> Yet, although Clinton won

the popular vote by a majority of almost 3 million, Trump managed to win more states and thus a greater number of electoral college votes.<sup>24</sup> As is customary, Merkel, like other international leaders, congratulated the new president-elect on his victory. The chancellor used the opportunity, however, to remind him of the importance of upholding western values.

Merkel's remarkable and unprecedented statement did not go down well with the president-elect. Extraordinarily, she not only congratulated him on his election victory but also indicated that Germany's relations with her European partners were 'deeper' than those with the United States. 'Germany's ties with the United States of America are deeper than with any country outside of the European Union', she put it diplomatically. Getting into her stride in the very next sentence, she issued a set of conditions for cooperating with Trump's government, conditions that ran counter to many of the ugly and nationalistic pronouncements the president-to-be had made during the election campaign.<sup>25</sup> Her statement said:

Germany and America are bound by common values – democracy, freedom as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of each and every person, regardless of their origin, skin color, religion, gender, sexual orientation or political views

'It is based on these values', the chancellor continued, 'that I wish to offer close cooperation, both with me personally and between our countries' governments.' It seemed that no cooperation was possible if these values were not respected by the 45th president. Still, she continued more tactfully, 'partnership with the United States is and will remain a keystone of German foreign policy so that we can tackle the great challenges of our time'.<sup>26</sup>

Other German politicians were less polite. Defence Minister von der Leyen referred to Trump's victory as a 'heavy shock' and the German justice minister thought that 'the world won't end, it just keeps getting crazier'. Sigmar Gabriel, the outspoken economics minister, who in late January 2017 was appointed Germany's foreign minister, said at the time that Trump was 'the trailblazer of a new authoritarian and chauvinist international movement ... They want a rollback to the bad old times'. Gregor Gysi, the formidable former leader of the Left party, put it particularly succinctly when he told German radio that Trump was 'a simple soul, not particularly well-educated, he's coarse'. Gysi feared that 'this will give right-wing populism a new boost in Europe'.<sup>27</sup> Foreign Minister Steinmeier, who was elevated to the German presidency in March 2017, uttered in exasperation that 'nothing will be easier, a lot will be more difficult. We don't know how Donald Trump will govern America'. One thing is certain, he presciently told the German news agency DPA, 'U.S. foreign policy will be less predictable'.<sup>28</sup>

#### UNEASE ABOUT THE VALUES OF THE NEW PRESIDENT

German policy makers, including the chancellor, felt that they were called upon to educate the new nationalist American president, who was inaugurated on 20 January 2017 and did not seem to have much sympathy for or understanding of western democratic values. For the German public and German politicians, it was difficult not to look

back to January 1933 when Hitler took power in Berlin. He charmed and bullied the electorate with outrageous nationalist and racist promises to make Germany great again and put Germany and the Germans first.<sup>29</sup> Trump did not refer to the at least 6 million Jews who perished at the hand of the Nazis when he issued a statement to commemorate Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January 2017.<sup>30</sup> This confirmed a rather uneasy feeling among most Germans regarding the strange convictions and worldviews held by Donald Trump and the people around him.

This unease and concern was confirmed by Trump's executive order 13769 of 27 January that limited immigration from seven Muslim countries, suspended all refugee admissions for four months and barred all refugees from Syria indefinitely.<sup>31</sup> Before a court order temporarily halted the president's executive order two days later, apparently at least 60,000 visas were revoked that had been issued to citizens of these countries.<sup>32</sup> Trump's second, somewhat watered down, travel ban, dated 6 March, fared no better. It excluded Iraqi travellers, made no explicit reference to religion and removed a complete ban on Syrian refugees. Yet it was also struck down by the courts, as were the subsequent appeals.<sup>33</sup> In late June the Supreme Court, however, overturned these decisions and allowed a partial travel ban to come into effect. It also provided for a great number of exceptions when travellers from the affected six Muslim countries had family and institutional links to the US. The court announced that it would hear the whole case in full in October.

Obviously, Trump is no Hitler and America's democratic institutions are much more formidable than the weakened democratic set-up of the Weimar Republic. Tension and mutual incomprehension between the US president and the German chancellor are rather unfortunate, however.<sup>34</sup> They may well have serious consequences for the western world and perhaps even for global stability and peace. For better or worse, the US remains the world's leading economic power. The country also has by far the globe's most formidable military, both in terms of its conventional and nuclear arsenal and Washington's warfighting expertise and experience. Despite Germany having the world's fourth strongest economy, by comparison the German chancellor and her much smaller country are much less important.

Nevertheless, due to recent developments in the context of the Euro crisis and the renewed rise of populist nationalism and racism in many EU countries, Angela Merkel has been catapulted to being perhaps the last hope for the survival of liberal democracy and democratic stability on the European continent.<sup>35</sup> The Greek state and many Italian banks continue to be highly overleveraged and could collapse any time soon. Both Spain and post-Brexit UK are faced with serious threats to their national unity, if respectively Catalonia and Scotland succeed in their strivings for independence. The UK was further destabilised by an unnecessary snap general election in June 2017. The election outcome led to a new unstable Conservative government that was dependent on the Northern Irish unionists for its narrow majority.<sup>36</sup>

There are also frequent disconcerting flashes of violence and unrest in the Balkans. Russian pressure and intimidation in much of eastern Europe – and not just in Ukraine – is meant to encourage the countries in the region to re-consider their links with NATO and the western world. Increasingly autocratic governments in Hungary, Poland and also in the Czech Republic are making determined efforts to restrict the rights to free speech, free assembly and other democratic rights. They are undermining the values

Europe has been based on for the last 70 years. Similarly, the autocratic developments and multiplying human rights violations in Turkey, a NATO member and still formally an aspirant for EU membership, are viewed with great suspicion by most European countries.

Bilateral relations between the US president and the German chancellor thus matter a lot, perhaps much more than at any time since the end of World War II. For Trump is a 'people person', he told the visiting British prime minister in late January 2017.<sup>37</sup> Good relations with a particular government appear to depend on whether or not Trump hits it off with the leader of that country. Trump is clearly fond of strong autocratic men and has repeatedly praised leaders such as Russia's Putin, Turkey's Erdogan, El-Sisi of Egypt, Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Saudi monarch, Philippine President Duterte and similar figures. He admires their ability to issue commands without having to be too concerned about public opinion, political criticism and messy deliberations of democratically elected parliaments. The world in the Trump era is witnessing the return of personal power politics. And in this context Angela Merkel and the Germans, as well as the other members of the western alliance, of course, face an uphill task to make their voices and the voice of liberal democracy heard in Washington, DC.

#### *The First Phone Call and the First Visit*

It was more than two months after Merkel congratulated Trump on his election victory and a week after his inauguration that the two politicians touched base for the first time by talking on the phone on 28 January. American and Russian officials needed two hours to release a joint press statement after the first phone conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on the same day. It took American and German officials more than twice this time to work out a statement after the phone communication between the US president and the German chancellor.<sup>38</sup> This was one of several indications that the 45-minute talk between Trump and Merkel was actually much more challenging for Trump than his talk with the Russian autocrat. It may also have been much less pleasant and flattering.

The phone conversation between Trump and Merkel, however, was amiable enough at first. The tension and mutual recriminations built up during the US election campaign appeared to be forgotten. Trump, after all, has a certain rough-and-ready charm if he puts his mind to it and Merkel is also quite capable of employing well-honed social skills. The long-serving German chancellor and the new president were able to agree on some matters, such as the importance of further deepening 'the already excellent bilateral relations in the coming years'. Trump was happy to accept an invitation to attend the G20 summit in Hamburg in July. He expressed the hope that he would 'soon' have the pleasure of welcoming the German leader in Washington. Despite Trump referring to NATO as 'obsolete' only a few weeks prior during the election campaign, both politicians emphasised the 'fundamental significance' of the NATO alliance for transatlantic relations and the fight against international terrorism.<sup>39</sup> Already in his press conference with the British prime minister Theresa May in late January, the president had confirmed that he was '100% behind NATO'.<sup>40</sup>

Merkel was ready to compromise on some issues, as she had indicated in the last few weeks. Much to Trump's delight, the two of them agreed on the necessity of making new 'investments in the military capabilities' of the alliance. They also emphasised

the importance of ‘a fair contribution of all allies to collective security’. Trump’s push to get all NATO members to actually dedicate 2 per cent of their GNP to their defence spending found Merkel’s approval. This is a self-mandated commitment that has long been accepted in principle by all NATO members. It was first drawn up as a guideline at the 2006 NATO meeting in Riga, though it was not even mentioned in the summit communique. In 2014, at the Cardiff summit, a few months after Russia had annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine, NATO members agreed that all members should ‘move toward’ the 2 per cent goal by 2024.<sup>41</sup> This was not a binding commitment either; rather it was a serious aspiration. Trump’s treatment of the 2 per cent defence contribution of NATO members as a binding and non-negotiable target which needs to be met immediately does not reflect what was actually agreed upon. Despite raising its contribution recently, Berlin itself only manages to dedicate just about 1.2 per cent of the country’s GNP to defence but the Germans intend to invest more in the future.<sup>42</sup>

Trump has also consistently misunderstood the contributions NATO member states make. The 2 per cent refer to an increase in the defence expenditure of each member state; how they then spend their defence budget is left entirely up to them. It is not a contribution to a common and shared NATO budget. Such a budget does not exist. While all member states make a small contribution to NATO headquarters for the running and administrative management of the headquarters, this is a tiny sum and none of the NATO members are in arrears regarding this contribution.<sup>43</sup>

Apart from security matters, during their phone conversation Merkel and Trump also talked about the situation in the Middle East and in North Africa. They also discussed relations with Russia and the Ukraine question.<sup>44</sup> Whether or not the lifting of the sanctions on Russia was talked about remained unclear initially. Yet a day later Merkel’s spokesman, Steffen Seibert, said that EU sanctions on Russia had indeed been discussed. Soon he also made clear that Merkel had talked to Trump about his executive order of 27 January restricting travel from seven Muslim-majority countries. ‘The chancellor regrets the U.S. government’s entry ban against refugees and the citizens of certain countries’, her spokesman announced.<sup>45</sup>

It appears that Merkel lectured Trump in no uncertain terms about her firm conviction ‘that the necessary decisive battle against terrorism does not justify a general suspicion against people of a certain origin or a certain religion’. Merkel explained to the freshman president that ‘the Geneva refugee convention requires the international community to take in war refugees on humanitarian grounds. All signatory states have this obligation’. This seemed to be quite new to Trump, who had only vaguely heard about the Geneva Convention.<sup>46</sup> Not unexpectedly, the new president, who has a rather delicate ego and is used to giving commands at Trump Tower, his business headquarters, was not impressed by Merkel’s admonition. In fact, Trump appeared to view Merkel with increasing suspicion, if not disdain.

Only a few days later, before her press conference with Ukrainian President Poroshenko on 30 January, the German chancellor once again referred to Trump’s executive order on mostly Muslim immigration to the US as unacceptable.<sup>47</sup> The day after, during a visit to Stockholm, Merkel sharply rejected Trump economic adviser Peter Navarro’s accusation in the *Financial Times* that Germany was unfairly benefiting from a ‘grossly undervalued’ euro. He claimed that Germany kept the euro artificially

weak in order to obtain an export advantage and thus exploit both its EU partners and the US. He also said that this German policy had been the main hurdle during the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) negotiations between the EU and the US during the Obama years. They were now effectively dead, he said.<sup>48</sup> Already during the election campaign Trump had accused China of manipulating its currency to obtain trade advantages. The administration was now making similar accusations against Germany (and also Japan), though the phrase ‘currency manipulation’ was not used, possibly because it would have certain legal implications. But soon the president called the EU a ‘vehicle for Germany’, much antagonising the German government in the process.<sup>49</sup>

These were worrying developments. Already the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Asian TPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership), Washington’s desire to reopen the negotiations for a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada and various other hostile remarks by the new president indicated that Trump had turned against multilateral free trade arrangements. He was in favour of bilateral deals where US power and influence can dominate more easily. Speaking in Stockholm, Merkel defended Germany by saying that the European Central Bank was totally independent and did not take instructions from national governments. Indeed, the German government has been very critical of the European Central Bank’s bond buying programme that has weakened the common currency.<sup>50</sup> However, the large German trade surplus with the US and much of the euro zone has been controversial for some time. Berlin, some analysts have concluded, as had President Obama in 2009, ought to rebalance its economy by stimulating domestic consumption and embarking on a domestic investment programme. There is indeed some wisdom in these calls.<sup>51</sup>

Still, Navarro’s attempt to drive a wedge between the EU countries was a disconcerting development. This used to be just Russia’s and China’s policy; the Trump administration seemed to have jumped on board for purely nationalist economic reasons. Trump intended to dismantle multilateral economic globalisation in favour of bilateralism. Navarro approved of a 20 per cent import tax plan that he believed would pay for Trump’s pet project, the building of a wall along the border with Mexico. In his *FT* article, he explained that the new US administration thought it best to unwind and repatriate the international supply chains that all global multinational companies require. ‘We need to manufacture those components in a robust domestic supply chain that will spur job and wage growth’ in the US, he outlined.<sup>52</sup> For Germany, one of the world’s most globally integrated economies, and its strong export industry such a nationalist and protectionist American approach would be disastrous.

A few weeks after her phone conversation with Trump Merkel attended the Munich Security Conference. Her meetings with Vice-President Pence and other members of the administration, such as Secretary of State Tillerson and Defence Secretary Mattis, went very well. Merkel hoped that a personal talk with the new president himself would also make a positive difference. ‘Face-to-face talks are always much better than talking about each other’,<sup>53</sup> she told journalists.

On 17 March 2017 Merkel came for a flying one-day visit to Washington, DC. She brought chief executives from Siemens and BMW along as both companies have large factories in the US and provide employment for thousands of American workers. But

the main reason for her visit was to set up a decent working relationship with the new administration.

The talks with the new president did not go too well, however. The body language of both politicians indicated no real warmth between them. And in the Oval Office Trump even seemed to ignore Merkel's suggestion to shake hands again when a reporter asked them to do so again for the sake of the cameras (they did shake hands when they first met). He looked straight ahead and did not seem to have heard her, or pretended not to have heard her. Over lunch Trump reportedly even handed Merkel a fake invoice for over \$300 billion, the amount, according to the calculation of the White House, the Germans had not spent on defence since the late 1990s. The chancellor was not impressed; a German minister called it 'outrageous'.<sup>54</sup>

The substantive talks between Trump and Merkel went fairly well, however, though they remained quite superficial. Both leaders believed that sanctions on Russia should only be lifted if Moscow implemented the Minsk II agreement fully to resolve the Ukrainian situation. Merkel agreed with Trump that NATO members should increase their defence spending. She also emphasised the value of free trade and the inadvisability of protectionism. Several times Trump proposed a bilateral trade agreement between the US and Germany, in order to reduce the high German export surplus with the US. The president, however, did not understand that the chancellor was neither ready, nor able to respond to this, as already many years ago the individual EU member states had delegated the task of negotiating trade deals to the EU Commission. Since then they have not been entitled to negotiate bilateral national deals.

When Trump eventually grasped this, he said that in that case the US and the EU needed to embark on trade negotiations. It remained an open question whether he was serious. Did this mean that the administration would be interested in reviving the TTIP negotiations that have been on halt since Obama left the White House? Altogether the first Trump–Merkel meeting did not result in a new closeness in German–American relations. The *Washington Post* talked of a 'frosty' event.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, only a day later, during the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bankers in the German Baden-Baden, the US Treasury Secretary Mnuchin refused to sign the customary G20 declaration that expressed strong support for free trade and condemned trade protectionism. While the meeting was friendly and non-combative, apparently, the White House had not given him the authority to do so. A reference to the expectation of the G20 to finance measures against climate change was also dropped from the final communiqué that is meant to be unanimous. Both the US and Saudi Arabia had opposed its inclusion, though this had not been a problem during the previous year's G20 finance meeting.<sup>56</sup>

#### THE NATO AND G7 MEETINGS – MAY/JUNE 2017

An open clash between Trump and America's allies occurred during the president's visit to NATO headquarters outside Brussels on 30 May 2017 and the subsequent G7 meeting on Sicily in which he participated. In particular Angela Merkel was incensed. It was Trump's first presidential trip abroad and before coming to Europe he had visited Saudi Arabia and Israel. Both countries had feted him in a grand way which he greatly enjoyed. They certainly spared him any critical questions. This was rather different in

Europe. The other leaders of the G7 countries (Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, the UK) regarded Trump with great scepticism. They wished to persuade him to express his wholehearted support for NATO. They also urged him to commit his administration to continued membership in the Paris Climate Pact that after difficult and complex negotiations President Obama had signed together with his Chinese, Russian and European counterparts in December 2015. In the meantime, virtually all other countries on earth have joined and mostly ratified the pact (only Syria and Nigeria are not on board).

Yet both endeavours failed. Instead Trump persistently refused to announce his support for Article 5 of the NATO Treaty – the crucial mutual defence clause in case of an attack on any member state. Effectively, the entire NATO alliance is based on this Article. The US president only spoke in very vague words of the American approval of the alliance, but avoided any more concrete commitment. In fact, a few days later it emerged that Trump's advisers had given him a speech which contained strong positive words that endorsed Article 5. But Trump had deliberately ignored these words and taken out the relevant line when giving his speech. He clearly seemed to still doubt the value of NATO and continued to be deeply annoyed that the European allies in his view spend too little on defence. In fact, his speech contained angry words of admonition for the Europeans to increase their defence spending significantly.<sup>57</sup>

Trump puts up his own country as a role model in this context. The first draft budget the Trump administration submitted to Congress included a 10 per cent increase in US military spending (the draft budget is unlikely to pass without major congressional revisions, however). In fact, the Trump administration wishes to add \$54 billion to the US defence budget. This increase is almost as much as the entire Russian defence budget. If this is granted, the navy will receive most of the additional money. A large portion of it will be dedicated to a strengthened US engagement in the Pacific. This means in effect that Obama's never properly implemented 'Pivot to Asia' for better or worse may well be realised by the Trump administration.<sup>58</sup>

The dinner that followed Trump's 'public tongue lashing' of his NATO allies appears to have been even worse. NATO leaders were 'appalled' according to sources who were at the dinner. Trump gave an improvised speech, once again complaining that the NATO allies did not contribute enough to defence. They should not only spend 2 per cent of their GDP but it would be best if they spent 3 per cent of GDP. He seems to have threatened to cut US defence spending unless NATO allies made up the shortfall of not having spent at least 2 per cent during the last two decades. The president talked about 'back pay' due to NATO. And Trump does not seem to have wanted to discuss Russia's activities in Ukraine and eastern Europe at all. 'Oh, it was a total shitshow', one participant of the dinner said later. 'The dinner was far worse than the speech', a former US official said, who was informed about the dinner. 'It was a train wreck. It was awful.'<sup>59</sup>

No wonder that a few days after Trump's European visit German Chancellor Merkel gave a much-noticed speech in Munich: 'The era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent', she said, before adding: 'That's what I experienced over the past several days.' She explained that 'we Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands – naturally in friendship with the United States of America, in friendship with Great Britain, as good neighbours with whoever, also with Russia and other countries'. For Merkel, it was clear however that 'we have to know that we must fight for our future

on our own, for our destiny as Europeans’.<sup>60</sup> Although Merkel was in the middle of her re-election campaign to gain a fourth term as chancellor, her words were meant very seriously.

Subsequently, immediately after the NATO meeting in Brussels, the G7 meeting on Sicily took place. Here, however, the allies were no more successful in obtaining a commitment from Trump. This time they urged the president to adhere to the December 2015 Paris Climate Pact. Much to the consternation of the assembled western leaders the president explained that he had not yet made up his mind whether or not the US would leave the pact. He would announce his decision within the next few days on his return to the US.

This announcement occurred on 1 June when Trump assembled a large number of people in the White House Rose Garden and dramatically proclaimed that the US would leave the climate pact. Most of the world was shocked. Especially America’s European allies, in particular Germany, were greatly dismayed. Soon the Europeans decided to attempt to circumvent the White House and work with environmentally conscious American cities and states to continue implementing the climate pact.<sup>61</sup> Perhaps even more important was the agreement between the EU and China to establish an alliance to cooperate in fighting climate change.<sup>62</sup>

Thus, instead of improving transatlantic relations Trump’s journey to Europe contributed to a worsening of alliance relations. His journey did not help to clarify the traditionally strong American commitment to NATO and European integration. Instead, Trump’s rather lukewarm words on Article 5 and his strong criticism of the insufficient defence expenditure of most NATO countries undermined further the belief in US support for the western alliance.

On 9 June 2017, when answering a question about the US commitment to NATO at a press conference with visiting Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, Trump said, out of the blue, ‘Absolutely, I’d be committed to Article 5 ... certainly we are there to protect’. While all NATO members were relieved to hear him say this, it was a little late. Why had Trump not said so during the NATO summit in May? It did not go unnoticed either that Trump did not volunteer this information but gave it in response to a reporter’s question.<sup>63</sup>

Within only a short period of time Trump has indeed managed to make all NATO members wonder whether America has become a liability with regard to stability and reliability in global affairs. It also remains an open question whether or not the Trump administration has a genuine interest in the continuation of the transatlantic partnership. Canada, for instance, announced shortly after Trump’s NATO visit the expansion of its defence budget as the US could no longer be relied upon to provide global leadership.<sup>64</sup>

### *Trump, his Advisers, and Germany’s Foreign Policy Establishment*

The Trump presidency clearly continues to deeply worry the German foreign policy establishment. At first it was hoped in Berlin that once inaugurated the new president would stop his rather simplistic pronouncements and move away from his divisive election campaign toward the political centre. Trump, it was expected, would use the transition period and the early days of his presidency to transform himself into a much more mature and respected statesman (and perhaps even delete his twitter account). Yet this

did not happen. By now German politicians have given up hope that Trump will ever develop into a responsible politician. It seems that the world will have to come to terms with a rather impulsive, irrational, vain and frequently ill-informed and ill-advised president.<sup>65</sup> Trump, many are convinced, is an embarrassment to America and the western world but it is unlikely that he will be forced to leave office early.<sup>66</sup>

German foreign policy experts are deeply upset about Trump's inner circle. After all, a predilection for constant change, turmoil and self-promotion is the one enduring and reliable factor that characterises the administration and the president himself. This state of affairs reflects a deeper split within the Trump White House. A battle is being waged between the ideological Steve Bannon faction and a more pragmatic faction. Bannon himself, however, was dismissed as the President's Chief Strategist in August 2017. While the former faction wishes to bring down the modern bureaucratic (or administrative) state and go back to the America of Andrew Jackson and the supremacy of the white 'common man', the latter camp sees itself in the tradition of the conservative Reagan administration when the US was the undisputed global leader. As Andrew Sullivan argues persuasively, Bannon and company have a 'passionate loathing of the status quo' and a strong desire to return to America's golden self-contained past 'in one emotionally cathartic revolt'.<sup>67</sup> This applies to domestic but also to foreign affairs.

The more pragmatic faction is no less hard-line, but attempts to push the administration toward a more engaged and cooperative foreign policy that is, however, still based on rather nationalistic 'America First' sentiments. The president is frequently uncertain where to position himself and plays it by ear, allowing himself to be influenced by the situation at hand and the people he happens to encounter at any one time.

The administration, it seems, is still in transition regarding the personalities that shape the Trump era. With the exception of the 'Decisive Three' – the president himself and his two closest advisers, who happen to be married to each other and are drawn from his immediate family<sup>68</sup> – a closely knit network of Trump policy makers is only very gradually emerging. Berlin was greatly concerned about Trump's first national security adviser, General Michael Flynn. German diplomats regarded him as seriously 'durchgeknallt' (off the wall) and considered him to be rather a loose cannon.<sup>69</sup> His dismissal after only 24 days in office confirmed Berlin's assessment. But Germany remains deeply worried about some of Trump's advisers who also have a strong ideological bent.

Right-wing ideologues and inflexible economic nationalists such as Steve Bannon, Steve Miller, Sebastian Gorka, Kellyanne Conway, Peter Navarro and Kathleen McFarland are less important than they were in the very early days of the administration but most of them remain influential, even after some of them have left the White House such as Gorka, McFarland and, of course, Bannon himself. In particular, Miller and Conway are still important members of Trump's inner circle. Bannon and Miller authored Trump's gloomy inauguration speech which talked about the 'carnage' which allegedly dominated life in America. Both men are obsessed with the dangers accruing from Islamic jihad.<sup>70</sup> And Conway, who coined the silly phrase 'alternative facts', cannot even remotely be considered a serious foreign policy thinker either.<sup>71</sup>

Jared Kushner, the president's inexperienced 36-year-old son-in-law, an orthodox Jew, has been given responsibility for focusing on foreign policy toward Israel, China and Russia. While he travels the world on behalf of Trump, he seldom says

anything in public. There are no speeches or press statements that outline his views. He has remained a rather dark horse. After the election but prior to Trump's inauguration Kushner proposed to Russian ambassador Kislyak to set up a backchannel using the equipment of the Russian embassy in Washington while keeping it secret from US authorities.<sup>72</sup> This bizarre and possibly illegal episode, as well as Trump's firing of FBI director Comey and the alleged contacts between his campaign team and Russia, are now being investigated by at least three congressional committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee, as well as by a special counsel (former FBI director Robert Mueller).

Lately more competent experts with a greater grasp on reality, such as National Economic Council chairman Gary Cohn, a former Goldman Sachs banker, have seen their influence grow. Not least, the advice given by defence experts such as General H.R. McMaster, the national security adviser, and Secretary of Defence General James Mattis as well as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson are being taken more seriously by the White House – at least on occasion – than was the case initially.<sup>73</sup>

Yet this situation is in flux and there is no guarantee that the 'grown-ups' in the administration will continue to increase their influence. In fact, Tillerson has turned out to be a rather ineffective secretary of state. He is also in the process of downgrading staff numbers and thus the available expertise in the State Department to a significant extent.<sup>74</sup> McMaster is credited with having 'professionalised' the National Security Council, but lately Trump appears to have become 'disillusioned' with him. He has complained that his policy is being undermined and the president has openly clashed with the formidable general several times. McMaster's attempt to appoint Brigadier General Rick Waddell as his deputy was blocked by the White House.<sup>75</sup> For the time being McMaster remains in office; this may ensure that together with the skilful work of Defence Secretary Mattis a dose of reality continues to influence US foreign policy. Mattis is the administration's only formidable foreign and defense policy thinker. Tillerson has been rather disappointing in this as well as in many other respects. Furthermore, former four star General John Kelly has turned out to be a controversial and only semi-effective Chief of Staff.

Still, since the *Wall Street Journal* published an article co-authored by General McMaster and Gary Cohn one has to wonder whether there really are such big differences between the two foreign policy factions in the White House. The two authors explained, after all, that Trump had recognised with 'clear view' that there is no 'global community' and both friends and enemies compete vigorously with each other in the jungle of international relations. Instead of denying this elementary fact of international relations, the article emphasised, the Trump administration welcomed this fact.<sup>76</sup> Life was 'the naked, selfish struggle for money and power', a commentary in the *New York Times* summed up the foreign policy philosophy of the Trump government. Idealistic notions such as altruism, cooperation and fairness remained completely ignored. These convictions, according to the newspaper, were shared by all the important foreign policy experts in the Trump White House. This also explained the sympathy of the president for autocrats like Erdogan, Putin and similar undemocratic rulers, as they were all thinking along similar lines.<sup>77</sup>

While the Obama White House was proud of coming across as a reliable, trustworthy and predictable government,<sup>78</sup> Trump aspires to the opposite. He is mightily

proud of his ‘flexibility’ which, he believes, enables him to change course quickly whenever it seems appropriate to him.<sup>79</sup> ‘We must, as a nation, be more unpredictable’, he declared in April 2016 during a major campaign speech.<sup>80</sup> To many observers at home and abroad, however, this unpredictability comes close to incoherence and confusion, as the *Washington Post* has argued.<sup>81</sup>

The German foreign policy establishment is scared of the possible disastrous consequences of Trump’s presidency regarding intra-western relations and global stability and peace. In particular Trump’s trade policy, his attitude toward the EU and transatlantic relations and in this context also his ambiguous relationship with Russia deeply worry Berlin (as well as many other EU states).<sup>82</sup> EU Council President Donald Tusk, a former Polish prime minister, even said in January 2017 that for him a newly aggressive China, Putin’s Russia, ISIS and Donald Trump were the greatest external threats to the survival of the EU.<sup>83</sup>

*Trade policy.* In Berlin there is a great deal of concern regarding the new president’s protectionist trade policy which envisages the imposition of import tariffs as high as 35 per cent on, for instance, car manufacturers who do not produce their cars in the US but in cheap-labour countries. While all of Germany’s luxury car manufacturers such as BMW and Mercedes Benz as well as Volkswagen have factories on American soil, they also produce a great number of their vehicles in Mexico for export to the US. BMW and Daimler are in the process of building new factories in Mexico and Audi completed a brand new one last year. Although China has become a much more important market for German car companies, the US market remains vital. It is Germany’s second largest car market. In 2016 approximately 1.3 million German cars were sold in the US. The threatened imposition of high tariffs on German cars imported from Mexico would probably make them rather uncompetitive in the US.<sup>84</sup>

The growing German–American rift regarding Germany’s export surplus with the US was on prominent display when Trump visited Brussels in March 2017. Just before he lambasted his NATO allies for not meeting NATO’s 2 per cent defence spending target, he had a meeting with EU officials. According to several press reports Trump said: ‘The Germans are bad, very bad.’ ‘See the millions of cars they are selling in the U. S.? Terrible. We will stop this.’ EU Commission President Juncker, who participated in the meeting, attempted to calm down the row. Juncker explained to journalists that Trump said ‘we have a problem, as others do, with the German surplus. So he was not aggressive at all.

Yet the damage had been done. It had become obvious that for the first time since the Iraq war of 2003 the Germans and Americans were on a serious collision course. The chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the German parliament did not hide his anger. ‘U.S. President Trump isn’t capable of leading the Western alliance. In any case’, Norbert Röttgen fumed; ‘he isn’t interested in it at the moment’.<sup>85</sup>

*European integration.* ‘Brexit is going to be a wonderful thing for your country’, the US president told British Prime Minister May when she visited him in late January 2017.<sup>86</sup> Trump’s public support of Brexit, which he referred to as ‘fantastic’, his repeated public praise about Britain re-gaining its independence and its borders as well as his expectation that other countries will follow the British example has also

profoundly upset German policy makers.<sup>87</sup> Transatlantic relations were often influenced by economic rivalry and political difficulties. Yet from Truman and Eisenhower to Obama, all US administrations have strongly supported the European integration process. The only exception was the lukewarm attitude, for economic reasons, of the Nixon administration. But even Nixon fully realised how important for stability and peace (and economic well-being) on the continent the European project was.<sup>88</sup>

Despite some changes in the Trump administration's attitude, great enthusiasm or even strong support for the EU and the European integration process cannot be detected in Trump's Washington. Essentially Trump and his entourage believe in bilateralism, not in multilateralism. For a strong power such as the US it is of course easier to conduct talks and negotiations in a bilateral setting than in a multilateral one where the input of many smaller countries make it much more difficult for any power, strong or weak, to dominate the talks. Such a bilateral approach, for example, is also China's preferred course of action when discussing the problems in the South China Sea with the other nations that have sovereignty claims in the disputed waters.

Trump also has a very traditional understanding of the role of sovereign nation-states. It is essentially based on the concept of the concert of nations that dominated international politics in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. The president would certainly have no difficulty in agreeing with the well-known real political testimony given by British Prime Minister Palmerston. In 1848 Palmerston explained that his country had no eternal allies but that its interests were eternal and that it would be a duty to follow these interests. Palmerston – not unlike Trump – never referred to a country's values and the benefits of international cooperation. Clearly, this belief in a narrowly defined national interest also explains Trump's scepticism of NATO.

*Russia.* The new president's praise for Russian autocrat Putin has also led to much anger and anxiety in Europe. Moscow clearly meddled to a significant extent in the American election process and the connection between the Trump campaign and Russia remains a source of confusion.<sup>89</sup> Trump's strange fascination for the strongman in the Kremlin is greatly resented in Berlin and in eastern Europe. No one really understands it. In March 2014 Moscow, after all, violently annexed Crimea, an integral part of sovereign Ukraine, and Russian soldiers clandestinely invaded eastern Ukraine, thus attempting to destabilise the entire country. Putin's threatening behaviour toward the Baltic states and occasionally Finland and Sweden is also disconcerting.<sup>90</sup> In the final days of the Obama administration it led to the stationing of NATO troops in Poland, close to the Russian border.

In the last couple of years the barbaric bombing campaigns of the Russian air force on Aleppo and elsewhere in war-torn Syria on the side of Iran and Syrian President Assad has turned the German public and the German establishment abruptly against Putin, despite long-standing economic and cultural links between the two countries.<sup>91</sup> While Trump reacted forcefully when Assad's air force used chemical weapons on civilians in Syria in early April, Moscow claimed that it was not Assad but the rebel forces or perhaps the inadvertent explosion of a warehouse with chemicals that had led to the incident. On the whole, the Trump administration's policy toward Russia remains ambiguous. No clear policy line has yet emerged. This is despite the fact that economic

sanctions on Russia have not been lifted. Trump was even forced by Congress to strengthen sanctions in certain respects. Although he reluctantly went along with Congress, he made it clear that he considered the move counter-productive. The western alliance had first imposed sanctions on Russia after Moscow's annexation of Crimea in March 2014. This is a confusing state of affairs which the Europeans find highly disconcerting and unnerving.

#### CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

German–American relations remain crucial for the stability, security and well-being of Europe. They also remain vital for America. Both within the EU and NATO, Germany is one of America's most important, economically strongest and most stable allies. It is crucial therefore that the US president, after all still the leader of the 'free world', and the German chancellor get their act together. Trump needs to overcome his suspicion and mistrust of Angela Merkel. The German chancellor is already well aware of the fact that despite all his many political and personal flaws and nationalistic beliefs, engagement with Donald Trump and his administration is essential.

The US and united Germany are the leaders of the West. Essentially there is no one else with the capability to take over in an ever more complex, intertwined and dangerous world. Both leaders should live up to that awesome responsibility and try to get on with each other. Multilateral international cooperation, including European integration, are actually advantageous to the US and greatly beneficial to American well-being and security. Like it or not, in a tumultuous and volatile world, the US and Germany need each other and ought once again to cooperate closely with each other. Let's hope the Trump White House will become aware of this soon.

#### DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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## NOTES

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2. See the article by Dieter Dettke in this issue.
3. Quote: Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Outlook: America, Germany, and the Atlantic Community after the Cold War', in Detlef Juncker (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990. A Handbook, Vol.2: 1968–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.561.
4. See Klaus Larres and Peter Eltsov, 'How Adolf Hitler haunts Angela Merkel,' *Politico*, 26 May 2015: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/angela-merkel-hitler-118287> (accessed 30 June 2017).
5. While Merkel did not like it, Bush clearly meant it as a sign of affection. See Luke Harding, 'Bush Rubs Merkel the Wrong Way', *The Guardian*, 28 July 2006, available from <https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2006/jul/28/bushrubsm Merkel>; for the video, see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tUTwaSPcGno> (accessed 30 June 2017).
6. George W. Bush, *Decisions Points* (New York: Random House, 2010), pp.412–13.
7. See George K. Zestos, *The Global Financial Crisis: From U.S. Subprime Mortgages to European Sovereign Debt* (London: Routledge, 2016).
8. Quoted in Crawford and Czuczka, *Angela Merkel*, p.109.
9. *Ibid.*, p.108.
10. See for example, 'U.S. Spy Scandal Triggers Outrage, Paranoia in Germany', *NBC News*, 2 Aug. 2014, available from <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/nsa-snooping/u-s-spy-scandal-triggers-outrage-paranoia-germany-n170366> (accessed 30 June 2017)
11. In 1957 Konrad Adenauer had also addressed both Houses of Congress (but in two separate sessions).
12. For the video clips of both occasions, see: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?2289781-1/german-chancellor-address-joint-meeting-congress> (3 Nov. 2009); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZ5qOTEC93g> (7 June 2011) (accessed 30 June 2017).
13. See Alan Sugar, *What You See is What You Get: My Autobiography* (London: Macmillan, 2008).
14. At the age of 16 Donald Trump's grandfather Friedrich Trump emigrated to the US in order to escape poverty. He followed in the footsteps of his sister Katherine who had gone to the US two years earlier. Friedrich (now called Frederick) soon moved to British Columbia and opened a hotel and restaurant near the Klondike Gold Rush. He was stripped of his German citizenship in 1889 (when he left Bavaria he had not de-registered, and he had not fulfilled his mandatory military service). He became a US citizen three years later. In the same year, in 1892, he returned to Kallstadt to attend the wedding of his sister. Five years later, in 1897, Trump's grandfather visited Kallstadt again, where he met and became engaged to 20-year-old Elisabeth Christ, also from Kallstadt. In 1902 Friedrich Trump returned for a third time to Kallstadt to get married to Elisabeth; they moved to New York. But he had promised his wife that they would eventually settle in Kallstadt and in 1904 they returned there. Although he told the US authorities he would come back to the US, he took all his savings with him. However, he was unable to re-obtain his German citizenship; instead he was asked to leave within eight weeks, otherwise he would be deported, as he had left Germany without permission and before having fulfilled his military service. Thus in July 1905 Friedrich and his wife had no choice but to return to New York. Soon afterwards, in October 1905, Trump's father Fred was born. Just over 40 years later, in June 1946, Donald Trump was born in the same city. Incidentally, John Henry Heinz, the grandfather of the founder of the Heinz Ketchup empire (Henry J. Heinz), was also born in Kallstadt; he had immigrated to the US in 1840 aged 19. Henry J. Heinz was a second cousin of Donald Trump's grandfather, Frederick Trump. See Janosch Delcker, 'Donald Trump, Germany's Disfavoured Son', *Politico*, 23 and 28 Sept. 2017, available from <http://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-ancestry-forefathers-kallstadt/> For a detailed account, see Gwenda Blair, *The Trumps: Three Generations of Builders and a President, with a New Foreword* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001); and the documentary movie by Simone Wendel, 'Kings of Kallstadt' (2014), available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dSq6Sc35bY> (all accessed 30 June 2017).
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16. 'Things Donald Trump Said About Angela Merkel – and Vice Versa', *Deutsche Welle*, 13 March 2017, available from <http://www.dw.com/en/things-donald-trump-said-about-angela-merkel-and-vice-versa-a-37889332> (accessed 30 June 2017).
17. See Kevin Liptak, 'Trump Welcomes Merkel after Bashing her on Campaign Trail', *CNN*, 17 March 2017, available from <http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/16/politics/angela-merkel-donald-trump-washington-visit/index.html> (accessed 30 June 2017).

18. 'Things Donald Trump Said About Angela Merkel – and Vice Versa', *Deutsche Welle*, 13 March 2017. See also Meghan Keneally, 'What Trump and Merkel Have Said About Each Other', *ABC News*, 17 March 2017, available from <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-merkel/story?id=46198767> (accessed 30 June 2017).
19. *Ibid.*
20. For a good overview see NBC News, 'Trump to Speak with Merkel after a Campaign's Worth of Criticism', 27 Jan. 2017, available from <http://www.newsjs.com/url.php?p=http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-phone-merkel-after-campaign-s-worth-criticism-n713376>; See also James P. Rubin, 'Why is Trump Picking on Merkel?', 16 Jan. 2017, available from <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/why-is-trump-picking-on-merkel-214641> (all accessed 30 June 2017).
21. See 'Things Donald Trump Said About Angela Merkel – and Vice Versa', *Deutsche Welle*, 13 March 2017.
22. *Ibid.*
23. See Klaus Larres, 'Donald Trump's Foreign Policy: what do we know, what can we expect?' In *Depth Newsletter*, University of Nicosia, Cyprus, Vol.13/6 (December 2016): (Accessed 30 June 2017): [http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=538&Itemid=538n](http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=538&Itemid=538n).
24. See Jonathan Allen and Amie Parnes, *Shattered: Inside Hillary Clinton's Doomed Campaign* (New York: Crown, 2017).
25. For the video tape of her congratulatory statement, see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VnA0RtmZYBM> (accessed 30 June 2017).
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28. For the video of Steinmeier's short statement on 9 Nov. 2016, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIGffrTUuD8> (accessed 30 June 2017).
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33. See Adam Liptak, 'Trump Loses Travel Ban Ruling in Appeals Court', *New York Times*, 12 June 2017, available from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-court-of-appeals.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news>. See for a timeline of Trump's executive orders on immigration and the consequences and reactions: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-president-trumps-immigration-executive-order-legal-challenges/story?id=45332741> (all accessed 30 June 2017).
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